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Introduction 
 
The contemporary debate concerning the limits of feasible public policy is invariably 
conducted in the somewhat sinister shadow cast by the image of globalisation.  To have 
no opinion on globalisation is effectively to disqualify oneself from having anything to 
say about the way our world looks as we reach the millennium.  The BBC’s recent Reith 
Lectures are therefore wholeheartedly to be welcomed for opening a public arena in 
which to conduct a debate whose significance could scarcely be overstated.1
 
  In so doing, 
it offers the opportunity, if not to democratise globalisation, then at least to democratise 
the discussion of globalisation.  Whether intentional or not, the BBC has made it possible 
to extend and refocus the debate beyond the narrow terms of political and academic 
reference in which it is so frequently cast, thereby rendering it accessible to those on 
whose futures it will impinge most directly.  Moreover, in Anthony Giddens, the 
programmes’ producers could have made no better choice to lead the widening of the 
debate within the public domain. 
 
Beyond scepticism versus radicalism 
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That said, a debate requires protagonists.  It is our argument in this piece that if Giddens’ 
laudable aspiration to expand democratic possibilities within a truly global civil society is 
to be realised, then certain aspects of his own depiction of globalisation need to be 
challenged.  In particular, his concern to reduce the political economy of globalisation to 
a simple choice between the ‘radical’ and the ‘sceptic’ view raises more questions than it 
answers.2
 
  Within such a dualistic characterisation, the ‘radicals’ argue that the world in 
which we live has been so reshaped by a range of new global flows that the political and 
economic logics which underpinned the postwar system of autonomous nation states have 
been rendered anachronistic.  For the ‘sceptics’, by contrast, the empirical evidence for 
such flows is dubious at best.  Consequently, so too must be premature claims of a 
borderless world of perforated sovereignty and beleaguered states. 
Two issues need to be raised at this stage.  The first is Giddens’ questionable desire to 
side with the ‘radicals’, such is the strength of the statistical data which suggests that 
international markets systematically fail to clear in the manner predicted by the 
globalisation hypothesis.3
 
  Although this is hardly an inconsequential point, the second 
we argue is more fundamental still.  Giddens’ chosen framing of the discussion tends to 
restrict the debate about the current process of economic restructuring to one about the 
extent of change to which we have thus far been subjected.  To be a ‘sceptic’ is therefore 
merely to state that no change has occurred.  However, if the debate were instead 
refocused to consider the essence rather than the extent of globalisation — its quality 
rather than its quantity — a whole range of new questions would be brought into view.  
Recast in such terms, scepticism need not necessarily entail a refusal to accept that the 
world has changed.  For, it is possible both (i) to accept that the structures of the 
international political economy are in the process of being reconstituted; without (ii) 
having to attribute causal influence in such a process unilaterally to globalisation. 
Put simply, the challenge to Giddens’ radicalism does not only come from the sceptics of 
his own convenient depiction.  Indeed, there are a whole range of positions which it is 
possible to adopt which in some sense transcend the dualism of radicalism/scepticism 
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which Giddens constructs.  It is within this space, we suggest, that more nuanced 
accounts of the processes of globalisation and both the tendencies and counter-tendencies 
to globalisation might most fruitfully be investigated. 
 
In what follows, we aim briefly to elucidate one such alternative, focusing primarily on 
the issue which forms the basis of Giddens’ first lecture: the political economy of 
globalisation.  Our argument is simply stated.  When the debate about globalisation is 
reduced to the single question of its extent, all eyes tend to turn to the operation of a 
single causal mechanism.  Viewed through such a perspective, globalising outcomes are 
routinely assumed to be an effect of the remorseless flows of capital, people and 
information within a single world market.  What is more, such outcomes are also 
routinely constructed as an ‘inevitable’ effect.  Our objections are directed principally at 
precisely this logic of no alternative which globalisation is so frequently held to 
summon.4  We form such objections on the basis of the following claim.  Globalising 
outcomes are not simply a result of a new structure of global economic flows.  How could 
they be, given that there is, in any case, only superficial supporting evidence that such a 
structure is either qualitatively novel or, for that matter, genuinely global in nature?5  We 
argue that they also result from the ideas which prominent opinion-formers hold about 
such flows.6
 
  As Giddens himself notes, what is perhaps most novel and distinctive about 
the context in which we now find ourselves is the reflexiveness which has come with the 
emergence of the discourse of globalisation in the past 10 years or so.  
It is, then, not merely to globalisation but also to ideas about globalisation and their role 
in informing political behaviour that we turn our attention in this article.  Giddens’ Reith 
Lectures present an opportune starting point for such a set of reflections, not only because 
of his unmistakable influence on government thinking, but also because he himself 
rightly points to the centrality of ideas to the process of change he charts.  He argues 
persuasively that the “global spread of the term” is one of the most interesting aspects of 
the whole of the globalisation experience.7  That said, however, he is only half right to 
conclude that the idea of globalisation has “come from nowhere to be almost 
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everywhere”.8
 
  That it now appears to be ‘almost everywhere’ we are willing to concede.  
That it has come ‘from nowhere’ we contest. 
No political idea ever emerges in such a manner.  Ideas do not simply appear from thin 
air.  At all times they are embedded within, and conditioned by, the wider social 
formation of which they are themselves a part.  So it is with the idea of globalisation.  
The image of globalisation to which Giddens appeals is located within a distinctive 
conceptual paradigm or system of meaning which can only be masked by assumptions 
that it is effectively without origin.  The dominant discourse of globalisation has been 
promoted to the point to which it now seems to be ‘almost everywhere’ at least in part 
because it privileges the political interests of an ascendant social class to the exclusion of 
others.  Such a discourse renders ‘correct’ specific views of the world by reducing them 
to the status of mere ‘common-sense’.  But it is a distinctively western common-sense 
which is being normalised here; one which elevates the experience of a ‘shrinking world’, 
itself shared by only a limited number of (mainly) western individuals, to the status of the 
globalisation experience.  Giddens is therefore jumping the gun to declare that a truly 
globalised world is “our world” in a manner which implies a homogeneity of experience.9
 
  
We are not all such active or willing participants in the globalisation phenomenon as he 
suggests; some are clearly in a better position to access a globalised experience than 
others.  In an attempt to shed some light onto such a claim, we now turn directly to the 
issue of the implicit, though no less distinctive, system of meaning in which Giddens 
locates his understanding of globalisation. 
 
We’re all globalised now (but some are more globalised than others) 
 
Giddens begins his reflections on the theme of globalisation, as many have before him, 
with an anecdote; and, moreover, an anecdote of an increasingly familiar form.  He 
relates the story of an anthropologist studying a community in Central Africa who finds 
herself watching Basic Instinct on video, before the film had been released in London.  
At face value this would seem perfect evidence of the ‘borderless’ qualities of a 
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globalised world, populated by post-national peoples and animated by a cosmopolitan 
culture.  Yet this type of experience and the reporting of such an experience might be 
unpacked rather differently.  Note first the palpable sense of rhetorical surprise which 
invariably accompanies such anecdotal illustrations.  Giddens implicitly invites us to 
share a sense of amused discomfort that populations we have become accustomed to 
regard as somehow peripheral and disconnected from the capital-intensive consumer 
culture of the ‘advanced’ economies, should have such direct access to precisely the 
cultural texts by which we define our own identities.  There is a fine line to be drawn 
between such collective amazement at our ‘global age’ and a sense of righteous 
indignation that peoples we tend to regard as distant and different (in short, as ‘other’) 
might have a prior claim on such western consumer staples as the latest Hollywood box-
office hit movie.  Globalisation, then, at least in this account, would seem to imply 
familiar western experiences in non-familiar non-western contexts and, moreover, that 
such phenomena are both experienced and reported by westerners. 
 
When we consider the origins of the cultural text involved in this example, it is difficult 
not to question the popular depiction of globalisation as a process in which geography 
and history are simply dissolved by flows of commodities, capital, people and 
information.  Geography continues to matter; indeed, arguably it matters more.  For the 
very notion of flows, so central to arguments about globalisation, itself implies direction; 
direction, in turn, implies geography.  In Giddens’ favoured example, the mobile subject 
is a western academic – who, presumably, flew from London – and the text is a 
Hollywood movie.  Such flows are clearly directional, invariably one-way.  Thus, just as 
capital flows to contexts seen as conducive to investment returns, western consumer 
culture flows down gradients of affluence from those who produce to those who merely 
consume.  Globalisation is, then, by no means experienced equally; whilst empowering 
for those already empowered by their access to capital and the resources it might lead 
them to acquire, it is, by the same token, equally disempowering to those on the receiving 
end. 
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The directionality of the flows appealed to in popular accounts of globalisation is 
nowhere better illustrated than in the ‘reinvented’ tradition of the Reith Lectures 
themselves.  For here, the persistence of the national and the parochial in the face of 
global challenges is starkly revealed.  Giddens, an international (indeed, global) 
academic, addresses his audience on the subject of globalisation from various points 
around the globe, projecting his thoughts over the ‘old’ ether of the radiowaves and, 
simultaneously, through the new ether of the internet.  What could be more global than 
this?  Yet, the audience for this global advocate of a global age is not exactly a random 
sample of a global civil society — this is, after all, a lecture for the BBC in front of an 
invited audience.  What is more, Giddens’ choice of venues from which to address this 
audience (London, Hong Kong, Delhi, Washington and London again) is hardly evidence 
of the distantless and borderless qualities of a cosmopolitan world to which he alludes. 
 
First, Giddens’ lectures are given a sense of narrative coherence, indeed closure, by their 
internal geography.  Giddens’ reflections take the form of a tour.  He starts at home, 
reflecting on the nature of the journey ahead, before setting off for foreign pastures, 
returning home eventually to bring his commentary to a rousing and passionate 
conclusion.  Second, we should note that all the ‘global’ cities which form the venues for 
his commentaries are made accessible (at least to a trans-national business class) by 
means of direct flights from London, three of the four reside safely within the ‘triad’ of 
Europe, South East Asia and North America.  This ‘triad’, of course, accounts for an ever 
growing proportion of supposedly ‘global’ flows.  There is a clear danger, then, that in 
speaking of globalisation as “the way we now live”,10
 
 Giddens may be communicating a 
distinctly privileged and western experience to a distinctly privileged and western 
audience (of tourists, trans-Atlantic commuters and the like).  While the world may 
indeed by globalised, the experiences of some are clearly more globalised than others. 
 
Globalisation and neo-liberal ‘common-sense’ 
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To where does such an argument lead?  Certainly not to a wholesale dismissal of the 
relevance of Giddens’ intervention.  Our aim here is not to question the significance of 
globalisation.  Given the time and energy which governments currently spend 
‘responding’ to its perceived imperatives that would be to indulge a most unproductive 
and complacent scepticism.  Rather, our concerns relate to what exactly it is about 
globalisation that is deemed to be so significant.  For Giddens, it is the assertion that 
“globalisation is almost not worth naming now”, such is the extent to which it is “simply 
what we are”.11
 
  For us, it is the counter-assertion that the very idea of globalisation has 
now come to be used as a rhetorical façade, displacing the need for active consent for 
further neo-liberal restructuring and the further embedding of certain forms of privilege 
— both within the liberal democracies of the advanced capitalist west and, increasingly, 
between ‘the west and the rest’.  Giddens’ opening anecdote reveals globalisation as a 
series of ‘natural’ tendencies.  Our intention in reworking that anecdote has been to point 
to the manner in which such tendencies are actively constructed and to demonstrate how 
that process of construction reflects, indeed deepens, existing patterns of material and 
experiential inequality. 
Moreover, that process, we suggest, occurs within a wider political context of rhetorical 
imperatives, ‘harsh realities’ and ‘economic necessities’ which is itself increasingly 
immune to political contestation.  It is from such a process that we see the emergence of 
the political logic of no alternative which remains an understated, yet no less crucial, 
aspect of the ‘radical’ interpretation of globalisation with which Giddens associates 
himself.  If globalisation is ‘just the way we are’, as the radicals contend, then there 
would seem to be a conspicuous lack of feasible sites of resistance through which we 
could ever hope to become active agents in the shaping of the ‘way we might become’ — 
and, consequently, little to animate an inclusive vision of a democratic and cosmopolitan 
world order.  Put simply, this is a world of no opt-outs.  Globalisation is assumed to 
condition the limits of our social experience in a manner which we, as conscious political 
subjects, are unable to influence, leaving us radically disempowered before the 
juggernaut of inexorable and incessant change. 
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Quite clearly, such a situation is politically debilitating.  However, this sense of 
constrained political possibility is at least partially self-imposed.  Remember, the basis of 
our scepticism in relation to Giddens’ ‘radical’ stance is not that which he attributes to 
conventional ‘sceptics’.  Our position is not to downplay the significance of the changing 
structures of the international political economy.  Rather, it is to question the assumption 
that such change is being driven solely by the relaxation of barriers to market entry 
around the world, and a consequent quickening of the speed with which the world can be 
traversed by flows of capital, people and information.  In addition to such effects, 
globalised outcomes are also being driven by the ideas which public policy-makers hold 
about such flows.  In acting merely on the basis of the assumption that globalisation is the 
way we are, governments may well be in the process of normalising our experience of the 
world in such a manner. 
 
This takes us to the crux of the matter.  In the absence of the political contestation which 
might question, far less undermine, the radicals’ depiction of globalisation, that 
perspective has increasingly been rendered ‘correct’.  For, the consequence of politicians 
downsizing their expectations for government in line with the globalisation hypothesis is 
to provide further evidence consistent with such a hypothesis.  But it is much more than 
an analytical description of a new global age which is being affirmed in this way.  By 
reducing the ‘radical’ interpretation of globalisation to the status of mere ‘common-
sense’ through its constant repetition to the exclusion of all other voices, the discursive 
privileging inherent in such a dynamic has also served to lend the ideology which 
globalisation sustains a ‘common-sense’ status.  Like it or not, to accept the radical stance 
on globalisation as unquestioningly as Giddens does is to appeal to a set of ideas which 
have long been taken hostage by a distinctively neo-liberal articulation of systemic 
‘imperatives’.  Moreover, so long as such an articulation continues to be understood as 
just ‘how things are’, the political space would appear to be strictly limited for 
democratising globalising tendencies and rendering neo-liberal ‘common-sense’ once 
more open to question.  The radical perspective on globalisation, most particularly its 
assumption that this is a world of no opt-outs, is therefore a key factor in circumscribing 
the potential scope of democratic politics in current circumstances. 
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Giddens concludes his series of lectures by exploring precisely this relationship between 
globalisation and democracy.  Given the centrality of this question to our broader 
concerns, it is perhaps only appropriate that we too conclude our reflections by doing 
likewise.  Once again, however, we find it possible to offer only partial support for the 
position which Giddens adopts. 
 
 
The globalisation of democracy and the democratisation of globalisation 
 
Here, as elsewhere, there is much to commend.  Giddens deserves considerable credit for 
his thoughtful and sophisticated claims about the nature of democracy under conditions 
of globalisation.  He is clearly right to differentiate between the globalisation of 
democracy and the democratisation of globalisation: that is, between the spread of 
democratic regimes or, more accurately, those claiming democractic legitimation for 
themselves and the democratisation of processes of trans-national governance.  As he 
notes, the former is a very real tendency.  The latter, by contrast, is at best little more than 
a rather fanciful and utopian vision of a (distant) future.  For we are yet to devise, far less 
to implement, trans-national democratic institutions and processes which might ensure a 
reregulation of financial markets and custodianship of the environment alike.  Whilst one 
might question the optimism which clearly underwrites Giddens’ vision of a genuinely 
cosmopolitan world order, his recognition of the nature and immediacy of the task at 
hand is laudable. 
 
Nonetheless, as with other parts of the argument, Giddens’ views on globalisation and 
democracy are neither unproblematic, nor for that matter entirely consistent.  At one 
level, Giddens is surely right to point to the widescale disillusionment increasingly 
characteristic of western democracies – reflected even in the 1997 British general election 
which saw a landslide electoral victory difficult to reconcile with an alarming fall in 
turnout.  This Giddens attributes to a systematic depreciation in the faith, confidence and 
trust we have in our elected representatives and in the institutions of formal government 
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more generally.  Descriptively, Giddens’ logic cannot be faulted, yet there is surely 
something more significant underpinning this observation, something to which Giddens 
only briefly alludes.  For, as he suggests in the introduction to his first lecture, the radical 
view of globalisation which he seeks to defend (and which he counterposes to the 
sceptics’ complacent and nostalgic denial) provides politicians with a perfect alibi.  
“Nations have lost most of the sovereignty they once had,” he writes, “and politicians 
have lost most of their capacity to influence events”.12
 
  Is it any wonder, then, that the 
citizens of the advanced democracies should have become rather sceptical themselves 
about the claims made as to the democratic nature of their government?  Giddens here 
seems to impale himself on the horns of a particularly intractable and indeed disturbing 
dilemma.  For the very arguments he advances about the corrosive impact of 
globalisation on governmental autonomy at the national level can only further serve to 
deepen the sense of democratic disenchantment and disillusion he tellingly describes and 
understandably decries.  If there is, quite simply, no alternative to a single vision of 
economic possibility in an era of globalisation then, not only is there no alternative to the 
attendant political blueprint which such a vision implies, there is also precious little to 
animate democratic competition.  Democracy, at least in its national guises, would then 
seem to wither on the vine of globalisation, leaving radical globalists (like Giddens) to 
project their democratic pretensions elsewhere – notably, if implausibly, onto institutions 
of cosmopolitan global governance yet to be envisaged. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This brings us full circle, for it suggests the unwitting complicity of radical globalists in 
the diminution of the democratic process, at least at the national level.  Authors like 
Giddens, we suggest, have been far too quick, however unintentionally, to provide 
politicians with the convenient alibi they demonstrate themselves so quick to seize — 
namely, that there is little else they can do.  Yet, as a growing literature has charted in 
recent years and in copious empirical detail,13 much more could actually be done, even 
within the context of the changing structures of the international political economy.  The 
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quantitative evidence makes clear that the corrosive impact of capital flight on European 
social models, labour-market institutions and social democratic possibilities is frequently 
exaggerated.14
 
 
The neo-liberal ‘common-sense’ which emerges when the radical globalisation orthodoxy 
is expressed in policy terms suggests that the only way in which national economies can 
become internationally competitive is to derive comparative advantage through 
exploiting ever lower labour costs.  Ironically, however, this form of labour market 
‘flexibility’ has largely been shunned by the most successful firms in the most 
competitive sectors of the international political economy.  Increasingly, they have 
sought to compete on the basis of product quality rather than production cost.  
Immediately, then, it is apparent that there are alternatives to those routinely presented as 
inevitable under current circumstances.  Moreover, such alternatives are not merely 
hypothetical; they are already being pursued as a source of genuine competitive 
advantage.15  It is, of course, unlikely that every firm within every sector of every 
economy would be able to follow this ‘high road’ to competitive success.16
 
  Yet, it is a 
fundamental democratic priority that national electorates be given the opportunity to opt 
for such a developmental future.  We may find that we try, only to fail; but in many 
respects that is besides the point. 
What this clearly serves to indicate is the importance of the issues at stake here.  What it 
also suggests is that we continue to live in a world of alternatives — subject perhaps only 
to the proviso that the radical perspective which denies the very possibility of even 
thinking about alternatives is itself contested.  Whilst such a conception remains 
relatively unchallenged, the greatest threat to democratic political choice is not ‘the harsh 
economic reality’ of globalisation so much as the convenient alibi that many centre-left 
thinkers currently see it as providing.  If politicians continue to internalise the radical 
globalisation orthodoxy, there may well be no alternative to processes of economic 
convergence which increasingly bypass national democratic structures.  However, if they 
choose instead to resist such a position, then the parameters of the possible are both less 
economically restrictive and less democratically debilitating. 
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The choice is stark; its consequences could scarcely be more significant. 
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